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A MYTH OF SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS IN SOCIALIST ECONOMIES  
 
Vladimir Popov 
ABSTRACT 
 
Most of the time the budget constraints in the socialist economies were harder than in 
developing countries and no less hard than in developed countries. The soft budget 
constraints (SBC) in socialist economies were not pervasive, as most authors believe, 
but selective, i.e. involved subsidization of some enterprises/industries at the expense 
of the other. This type of selective subsidization is a classic case of industrial policy: 
it may be good or bad, leading to success (China, Vietnam) or failure (USSR, Eastern 
Europe), but cannot be regarded as an intrinsic feature of the socialist centrally 
planned economy and an example of pervasive SBC.  
 
Pervasive SBC should be associated with permanent government budget deficit, debt 
accumulation, high inflation and other forms of macroeconomic populism. In the 
Soviet Union in the post-war period (after the monetary reform of 1947 and until the 
Gorbachev financial and monetary expansion that started in 1987) budget deficit and 
debt were very low, open and hidden inflation was less than several percent a year – a 
better record than in most Western countries. But in the 1990s in Russia, other former 
Soviet republics and most East European countries budget constraints were weakened 
dramatically and inflation increased to hundreds and thousands percent a year. 
 
SBC is just one type of this populist macroeconomic policy that was rare in socialist 
countries, but is found in abundance in many developing countries (especially Latin 
America and Sub-Sahara Africa) and transition economies (especially FSU states).   
 
 
Keywords: Soft budget constraints, socialist economies, industrial policy 
 
JEL: H6, O25, P34, P35, P40, P43.  
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A MYTH OF SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS IN SOCIALIST ECONOMIES  
 
Vladimir Popov 
 
Introduction - what is considered a soft budget constraint?  
 
One of the most important papers on soft budget constraints by Kornai, Maskin and 
Roland (2003) characterizes the phenomenon as follows: 
 
“The term “soft budget constraint” (SBC), introduced by Kornai (1979, 1980 
and 1986), has become a familiar part of the economics lexicon. Originally 
formulated by Kornai to illuminate economic behavior in socialist economies 
marked by shortage, the concept of SBC is now regularly invoked in the 
literature on economic transition from socialism to capitalism. Indeed, SBC 
problems currently constitute a central policy issue in transition economies. 
But the concept is increasingly acknowledged to be pertinent well beyond the 
realm of socialist and transition economies. A host of capitalist phenomena, 
ranging from the financial difficulties of Chrysler in the 1980’s to the collapse 
of the banking sector of East Asian economies in the 1990’s, can be usefully 
thought of in SBC terms” (Kornai, Maskin, Roland, 2003). 
 
Kornai’s idea was that state-owned enterprises in socialist countries were not allowed 
to fail even when being unprofitable. Virtually always they were bailed out with 
financial subsidies or other instruments. There were no bankruptcies in former 
socialist economies and virtually never socialist enterprises were going out of 
business, even though often they were restructured and forced to change their profile.  
 
The SBC are often linked to another phenomenon described by Kornai (1980) –  
shortage economy. Lindneck (2007) claimed that “Kornai’s two most celebrated 
characterizations of real world socialist economies – “shortage economies” and 
production units with “soft budget constraints” – are analytically closely connected”.   
 
On the one hand, when the state covers the losses of the unprofitable enterprises, 
wages and profits exceed the value of output produced, so consumer and investment 
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demand can exceed the supply of goods. If prices are controlled and not allowed to 
rise to clear the market, shortages emerge. This phenomenon is known also as forced 
savings or monetary overhang or delayed demand. 
 
On the other hand, enterprises themselves do not have any constraints in expanding 
their demand for resources, so shortages emerge.  “As a result of the soft budget 
constraint, – writes A. Lindbeck, – firms tend to expand investment and production 
until they encounter nonfinancial resource constraints (hence shortages). This 
assertion was based on the rather realistic assumption that managers in such 
economies are mainly interested in the size, or rate of expansion of production” 
(Lindbeck, 2007).  
 
Some authors pointed out that the correlation between shortages and SBC is not 
inevitable, that “sufficiently high prices for consumer goods would nevertheless be 
able to abolish any consumer goods' shortages” (Gomulka, 1985), but somehow the 
wo concepts are regarded as ane indispensable characterization of the socialist 
(centrally planned) economies and entered textbooks on Comparative Economic 
Systems.  
 
This paper makes a non-conventional argument that there were less SBC in socialist 
economies than in other countries – most of the time budget constraints under central 
planning were much harder than in market economies with similar level of 
development. The argument in a nutshell is that pervasive SBC (with respect to all or 
most enterprises or industries) should be associated with the government budget 
deficit, but it was not the case in former socialist economies. Most of the time the 
government budget deficit was quite modest, whereas open and hidden inflation1 was 
relatively low. Hence, SBC in socialist economies were not pervasive, as the Kornai, 
Maskin, Roland (2003) believe2, but selective, i.e. subsidization of some 
enterprises/industries at the expense of the other. This type of selective subsidization 
                                                 
1
 Hidden inflation – increase in the gap between demand and supply of goods at fixed prices. It 
emerges when prices are not allowed to increase to clear the market and monetary overhang 
accumulates.  
2
 “In pre-reform socialism, SBC’s permeated all organizations” (Kornai, Maskin, Roland, 2003).  
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is a classic case of industrial policy: it may be good or bad, leading to success (China, 
Vietnam) or failure (USSR, Eastern Europe), but cannot be regarded as an intrinsic 
feature of the socialist (centrally planned) economy and an example of pervasive 
SBC.  
 
SBC under central planning  
 
It is said that SBC could exist in different types of economic systems, but are more 
often found in centrally planned socialist economies. Elements needed for the 
emergence of SBC “come together more frequently and in a wider set of cases under 
socialism and post-socialist transition than under systems where socialism has never 
arisen” (Kornai, Maskin, Roland, 2003). The central argument of this paper is exactly 
the opposite – in socialist countries institutional capacity of the state was stronger 
than in most similar income level developing countries, the socialist state had better 
ability to raise taxes, better control over government spending and government budget 
deficit; whereas subsidies in socialist countries were common, they were not 
pervasive and were financed via taxes or through price controls that redistributed rent 
from resource to other industries.    
 
Government budget in the USSR (1922-91) had a surplus most of the time, even if the 
purchases of the governments bonds by the population (which were virtually 
obligatory and hence should be really treated as taxes) are excluded. The only periods 
when the Soviet budget was in deficit were the 1930s (industrialization), the Great 
Patriotic War (1941-5) and the late 1980s (the beginning of the transition to the 
market).  In contrast, in the Russian Empire in 1803-1914 only in 6 out of 112 years 
government budget was in surplus (Tabata and Tabata, 2019). 
 
As fig. 1 shows, government budget deficit in 1980-85 was miniscule (only 1 to 2% 
of GDP), and increased to 9% of GDP only in 1988 as a result of reforms. 
Government debt was less than 20% of GDP until 1985, annual growth rates of 
money supply (M1) were below 7% until 1985 (fig. 2).   
 
There were shortages of many consumer goods (as well as excess inventories of the 
other goods), but generally prices were clearing the consumer market before 1985.   
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Fig. 1.  Government budget revenues, expenditures, and deficit, billion rubles 
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Fig. 2. Money supply growth rates (%) and government debt as a % of GNP 
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There was no general monetary overhang at the consumer market, or, to use the 
planning terminology of that time, personal income of households and their 
expenditure were roughly balanced.   
 
The growth of retail sales at current prices was roughly in line with the increase in the 
most important component of household money supply – bank deposits of population 
(fig. 3), that is to say, prices for consumer goods were generally set at a level that 
cleared the market. In the 1960s, when real growth was high – between 5 to 10%, 
retail sales were increasing at 6 to 10% rate; in the 1970s these rates fell to 5 to 7%; in 
the early 1980s – to 2 to 3% (fig. 3).  Personal deposits increased at a rate roughly 2 
times faster – this was largely voluntary accumulation of the financial assets by 
households (fig. 3).  
 
Fig. 3. Personal bank deposits and retail sales in current prices, annual growth 
rates, % 
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Source:  Goskomstat.  
 
An important evidence of the absence of monetary overhang at the consumer market 
until the end of the 1980s is the dynamics of household savings rate – it remained 
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relatively stable in 1970-85 (around 5%) and even decreased in 1975-82 before it 
started to rise above the historical 5-6% average in the second half of the 1980s – this 
is exactly when the forced savings/monetary overhang emerged and started to 
increase (fig. 4).  
 
Fig. 4. Household savings rate, as a % of personal disposable income 
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Source: Stabilization, Liberalization and Devolution: Assessment of the Economic 
Situation and Reform Process in the Soviet Union. EC, December 1990, p. 163. 
 
 
The inflation rate is difficult to estimate, price indices were not calculated properly in 
the USSR. The only price index that was computed in the 1930-40s was the retail 
trade price index (fig. 5), and it is known to understate actual inflation because the 
new goods were excluded from comparison (Shmelev, Popov, 1989), whereas in the 
conditions of pervasive price controls the creeping inflation was happening exactly 
via the introduction of new goods (without major quality improvements, but a few 
new bells and whistles, and considerably higher price). This index can be trusted only 
to indicate the general picture of price increases – prices increased considerably (20 
times even according to the index) in 1928-473, during the period of industrialization 
and war, fell by a goof half in 1947 after the confiscatory monetary reform of 1947, 
and were relatively stable for the next 4 decades (1947-87).  
                                                 
3
 20 times increase in 1928-47 is equivalent only to 17% annual inflation.  
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But it is quite obvious that inflation was running in the 1980s in the lower single 
digits: national income and retail sales in current prices in the 1980s were growing 
annually at 2 to 8% only (fig. 3), so with real growth at about 2% a year (this is the 
estimate of alternative statistics, not official), inflation could hardly have been higher 
than 5%.  
 
Fig.  5. Retail trade price index in the USSR, 1928 = 1 
 
Source: Goskomstat.  
 
Total inflation, including hidden (suppressed) inflation – the increase in the gap 
between demand and supply due to price controls – was estimated at below 5% until 
1987, but increased to 20% in 1990 (fig. 6).  
 
Another estimate of the suppressed inflation – increase in the ratio of collective farm 
market prices (reflecting supply and demand) to controlled prices of state retail trade. 
This ratio increased in 1950-1985 2.4 times (fig. 7), which is equivalent to the annual 
growth of 2.5% only. So even assuming that all the growth of the collective farm 
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market prices reflected inflation4, inflation in the Soviet Union in 1947-87 seem to be 
no higher than several percent a year, which is a better record than in most of the 
countries of the world at that time. The belief that soft budget constraints were 
“pervasive” simply does not square up with virtual absence of budget deficits, low 
growth rates of money supply and single digit inflation.  
 
Fig. 6. Inflation in the consumer market, % 
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Inflation in the USSR was caused not by SBC, but by the physical inability of the 
planners to control prices in industries with large and rapidly changing nomenclature 
of output (secondary manufacturing, construction, services) – every new product in 
these industries was a way to get a price increase, and it was virtually impossible for 
the planners to check millions of cost calculations and to stop creeping inflation. In 
resource industries and agriculture with fewer products and slowly changing 
nomenclature, price controls were much more efficient, so these industries 
experienced constant declines in profitability (fig. 8) due to growing costs of 
machinery and supplies and wages; periodically – once in 5 to 10 years – prices for 
                                                 
4
 Part of the increase in prices of the collective farm market as compared to prices of state trade most 
probably reflected the increase in the quality gap between goods sold in state retail trade and at the 
collective farm market. 
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these goods were increased in a one-time hike, so that these industries could become 
profitable again (Shmelev, Popov, 1989).  
 
Fig. 7. Prices of state trade and collective farm market 
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Fig. 8. Profitability of key economic sectors in the USSR in 1986, % 
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Socialist economies in this respect were not so much different from low inflation 
market economies, especially developing countries, where single digit inflation is of 
cost-push nature – prices and wages in these countries are rigid and increase due to 
market imperfections (adverse supply shocks), so the monetary authorities have to 
allow the money supply to expand to make sure that there is no recession. If inflation 
is running at a low level, the relationship between growth and inflation is positive 
(normal Phillips curve: negative relationship between inflation and unemployment, 
i.e. positive relationship between inflation and growth). Negative relationship between 
inflation and growth is in effect only when inflation exceeds several dozen percent a 
year. These non-linear links were studied extensively in the literature since Bruno and 
Easterly (1996) paper in developing countries and in  transition economies.5   
 
Soft budget constraints and industrial policy 
 
SBC did not “permeate all organizations” in socialist countries, as Kornai, Maskin, 
Roland, (2003) suggest, but were very selective, i.e. subsidies were provided to some 
enterprises/industries/regions at the expense of the other.  
 
All centrally planned economies had extensive explicit and implicit subsidies. In most 
EE and FSU countries on the eve of transition, in 1989-92 only direct subsidies from 
the government budget amounted to 10-15% of GDP (World Bank, 1996, p. 116; 
EBRD, 1997, p. 83). In addition to direct subsidies that went mostly to cover the cost 
of housing, public utilities and food (see table 1), there were hidden subsidies, in 
particular, low prices for fuel, energy and raw materials, not associated with any 
transfers to/from government budget, but efficiently redistributing rent from resource 
industries to secondary manufacturing and to all energy consumers. 
 
The impact of subsidies on growth may be different (Popov, 2019). On the one hand, 
there is an example of East Asian countries which were subsidizing strong and 
competitive export-oriented sectors and were relying on export as a locomotive of 
economic growth: in China, for instance, the share of export in GDP increased from 
5% in 1978 to 35% in 2006 (later fell to 20% in 2018), while the GDP itself was 
                                                 
5
 For a survey of this literature see: Polterovich, 2006; Popov, 2011 a, b. 
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growing at an average rate of about 10%. On the other hand, there are much less 
appealing examples of import-substitution industrialization (ISI) that involved 
subsidization of weak, non-competitive industries.  
 
Table 1. Subsidies to producers and consumers, 1989 
 Item Billion rubles As a % of GNP 
Total subsidies 126.5  13.7 
Budget subsidies to domestic producers and consumers 103.0 11.1 
   -Agro-industrial complex 
       -Food production 
           -meat & milk products 
           -other 
       -Farmers 
       -Subsidies for fodder, seeds, fertilizers, tractors, 
etc.     
 91.1 
 55.6 
 39.8 
 15.8 
 32.0 
  3.5 
 9.9 
 6.0 
 4.3 
 1.7 
 3.5 
 0.4 
   -Other subsidies to consumers 
    (housing, utilities, theatres, 
     etc.) 
 
 
  4.4 
 
 
 0.5  
   -Subsidies to heavy industry 
    (coal, thermal energy, etc.) 
 
  7.5 
 
 0.8 
Agricultural price support fund   9.3  1.0 
Subsidies for foreign economic activity (trade 
subsidies) 
 11.7  1.3  
Subsidies financed by tax offsets or outside the budget 
(construction of farmers markets, children's clothing, 
Ministry of non-ferrous metals) 
 
 
  2.5 
 
 
 0.3 
Source: A Study of the Soviet Economy. IMF, World Bank, OECD, EBRD, 1991. 
Vol. 1, p. 290-291. 
 
 
Soviet industrialization of the 1930s and beyond became a major isolationist import 
substitution experiment: from that time on the share of export in Soviet GDP did not 
increase until large scale fuel sales abroad started in the 1970s. The huge perverted 
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industrial structure created without any regard to costs and prices of the world market 
proved to be stillborn and nonviable in 1992, when it finally faced foreign 
competition after half a century of artificial isolation. One can also cite the examples 
of “the champion of isolationism” – North Korea – and other socialist countries, of 
many developing countries of socialist orientation, which were creating their own 
heavy industries following advises and using assistance of the Soviet Union, of India 
(where the share of export in GDP remained frozen at a level of 6% from the 1950s to 
the 1980s) and many Latin American countries. 
 
Theoretically, industrial policy in the USSR could have been better than the actual 
import substitution type that was never replaced by export orientation. It is inevitable 
that a country in need of industrialization starts with the import substitution policies 
(because the creation of new industries that were absent before results in crowding out 
foreign goods from domestic market), but there is a need to switch to export 
orientation at an appropriate point. If enterprises eventually do not become 
competitive in the international market, they evolve into grandiose, but useless 
“industrial dinosaurs” and “Egyptian pyramids” that can exist only behind a 
protectionist wall and that go bankrupt as soon as they are exposed to the winds of 
international competition. But there are examples of export orientation within the 
framework of the CPE: China started to increase it exports at double digit rates from 
the early 1970s, well before the market type reforms. 
 
There is a certain irony in that some authors, denouncing SBC, point out to China of 
the 1980s – one of the most successful cases of catch up development in history.  
“Indeed, –  writes one of them, – the concept is also highly relevant for China during 
the period of economic transition after 1980 – with large volumes of “soft”, in fact 
often non-performing, loans by state banks to state firms” (Lindbeck, 2007). 
 
By the mid-1990s direct subsidies in most of East European and FSU countries 
declined to about several percent of GDP (0-4%)6 and relative prices largely started to 
approach world market ratios. But with democratization small and well organized 
interest groups, such as resource companies and military industrial complex, found 
                                                 
6
 World Bank, 1996, p. 116; EBRD, 1997, p. 83. 
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themselves in a position to exercise greater lobbying power than numerous, dispersed 
and unorganized consumers (Olson, 1971). The weak state was unable to resist the 
pressure of these srong interest groups, and in addition to the inefficient industrial 
policy there emerged an aray of SBC that contributed to macroeconomic instability 
that had not existed in the socialist period.  
 
Macroeconomics of populism 
 
SBC is just one type of populist macroeconomic policy that was rare in socialist 
countries, but is found in abundance in many developing countries (especially Latin 
America and Sub-Sahara Africa) and transition economies (especially FSU states).  
Most of them experienced macroeconomic instability – budget deficits, inflation, 
increased domestic and foreign indebtedness, overvalued exchange rates leading to 
currency crises – more than once in their recent history, after the transition to the 
market and democracy.  
 
Inflation surged in the CIS and some Balkan states after the transition to the market 
and remained rather high for a number of years (since the late 1980s in Yugoslavia 
and in 1992-94/5 in Bulgaria, Romania, and CIS) – table 2, and re-materialized a 
couple of years later, after the currency crises (Bulgaria and Romania – in 1996-97; 
Belarus – in 1997-98; Russia – in 1998) – (Popov, 1995; 1996).  
 
Budget deficits and their financing through money printing and/or debt accumulation 
were common in the post-Soviet space in the 1990s. In Russia government budget 
deficit increased to 20% of GDP in 1992 and remained in the range of 10% of GDP 
until the currency crisis of 1998 (fig.9).  
 
Prices distortions in transition economies were also very pronounced. In all resource 
rich post-communist countries domestic prices for fuel were kept below the world 
market level (usually below 50%) through export taxes (on exports of fuel) and direct 
restrictions on exports (export quotas, access to the pipeline). In 1997, for example, 
effective electricity tariffs in most EE and FSU countries were 1 to 4 US cents per 
kWh (only in Poland, Latvia, Hungary and Slovenia it was 6 cents and higher) as 
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compared to 8 cents in the US and 14-15 cents in 15 European Union countries at that 
time on average (EBRD, 1998, p. 43).  
 
 
Table 2. Inflation in East European and former Soviet Union countries in the 
1990s, % a year (retail trade or consumer price index) 
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If subsidization is carried out through price controls, price distortions worsen the 
allocation of resources7. In all countries, where energy is cheap, the energy intensity 
of GDP is high: in FSU electricity consumption per $1 PPP GDP in the 1990s was 
nearly 2 times higher than in EE countries, whereas in EE countries it was 2 times 
higher than in Western Europe (EBRD, 1998, p. 47). Only in 1996-98, when domestic 
energy prices in these countries started to approach the world level, energy intensity 
showed some signs of decline, but not for long. The new drop in relative domestic 
energy prices after 1998-99 devaluations in the CIS states staged conditions for 
another round of increase in energy intensity (Polterovich, Popov, Tonis, 2008).   
 
 
Fig. 9. Consolidated government revenues and expenditure, % of GDP  
 
Source: EBRD Transition Report, various years.  
 
 
Why transition economies developed these SBC, even though there was a clear 
understanding that such policies are sub-optimal?  Why there were persistent (and not 
cyclical) budget deficits, accumulation of debts beyond the ability to pay, debt and 
currency crises, high inflation, price and exchange rate mismanagements? Why 
Russia and other resource abundant CIS states had to struggle with budget deficits, 
high inflation and currency crises in the 1990s and are still choosing to keep fuel, 
                                                 
7
 Consumer subsidies have similar effect – they favor consumption over savings and lead to inefficient 
use of subsidized goods (housing, energy, etc.). In addition, consumer subsidies are generally socially 
unfair, since more subsidies go to households that consume more (which are usually the richest). 
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energy, and resource prices low and thus are relying once again on import 
substitution, which seem to have lost in recent decades all the supporters among 
economists and policy makers? 
 
Transition economies could be quite similar in this respect to developing countries, 
where the political economy of subsidies and macro instability were thoroughly 
analyzed8. Three decades ago the research on the macroeconomics of populism in 
Latin America raised similar questions (see Castanheira and Popov, 2000 for a 
summary) and suggested two answers: (1) sharp asset and income inequalities (as 
compared to Asian countries) and (2) sharp division between primary products export 
sector controlled by the traditional oligarchy and employers and workers in industry 
and services (Kaufman and Stallings, 1991). It was argued that upper income groups 
are generally in a good position to resist taxation and this placed a limit on the 
capacity of Latin American governments to deal with distributive pressures within the 
context of the growth-oriented export models.  
 
In small open European economies, the expansion of the welfare state allowing to 
adjust painlessly to costs of internationalization, was an important political 
concomitant of liberal trade policies. In East Asian countries political weight of urban 
popular groups (pressing for redistribution of export revenues in their favor) was 
counterbalanced by the presence of the large class of independent farmers or small 
export-oriented manufacturing firms. In contrast, in Latin America the state had a 
much more limited capacity to tax income and assets directly, and the export-oriented 
oligarchy was not willing to share its revenues, but at the same time not able to resist 
the pressure for redistribution because of political isolation. 
 
The heritage of the CPE put the transition economies into a situation, somewhat 
similar to Latin American countries. In the very beginning of transition, after the 
deregulation of prices, they experienced a dramatic and quick increase in personal 
income inequalities and sectoral inequalities in the profitability of enterprises. 
                                                 
8
 To be sure, political influence is one of the major reasons. Among different explanations of SBC, 
there are references to political influence, creditor's lack of information and commitment, and insider 
control, but there is no evidence that these factors decrease in response to financial losses (Li and 
Liang, 1998).  
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Previously, under authoritarian regimes, the government was strong enough to impose 
substantial burden of transfers on the producers (the government revenues in most 
former socialist countries were way above 50% of GDP). Newly emerged weak 
governments, however, were not only in a position to maintain large scale open 
subsidization, but also experienced falling budget revenues.  
 
The shadow economy expanded dramatically in the 1990s. Estimates based on 
electricity consumption suggest that in Eastern European countries the share of 
shadow economy in 1989-94 increased on average from 18 to 22%, whereas in the 
former Soviet republics it increased from 12 to 37%9.  As a result, the government 
was unable to raise tax revenues. In Russia government revenues plummeted after the 
CPE was dismantled, falling below 30% of GDP (including off-budget funds) in 
1997. This was still more than in East Asian countries and other economies with 
similar GDP per capita on average, but much less than in Central European countries 
and much less than needed to finance government commitments - still very large 
agricultural and housing subsidies, mostly free education and health care, and 
universal pay-as-you-go system of social insurance.  
 
Deprived of the much needed revenues and not being able to renege on its obligations, 
the government had to resort to alternative ways of financing its commitments – 
inflationary financing, building up domestic and foreign debt, maintaining the 
overvalued exchange rate, driving foreign borrowing up and/or foreign exchange 
reserves down. 
 
Inflation, in fact, resulted from the weakness of post-communist governments caused 
by the lack of consensus on the issue of financing the costs of economic reforms. The 
Chinese government was able to impose such a consensus “from above” using 
authoritarian methods, and in Central European countries this consensus was built 
“from below” leading to the emergence of relatively strong democratic governments. 
In contrast, the CIS and South East Europe societies have been more divided than in 
Central European countries and Baltic states, where a greater consensus on how to 
proceed with economic reforms existed. 
                                                 
9
 World Bank, 1996, p.27. 
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In Russia, for instance, there were clear and deep contradictions between major 
industrial groups (namely, agriculture, defense and machine building, and fuel and 
resource sector) on the issue of financing economic reforms. Its weak democratic 
government was not able to withstand the pressure of these interest groups 
(“complexes”, as they are called in Russia – fuel and energy complex, military 
industrial complex, and agro-industrial complex10), political opposition, and regions, 
and, as a result, did not have the power to bring its expenditure in line with the 
revenues. The lack of political consensus at three levels – between the central 
government and the regions, between the parliament and the government, and within 
the government itself – may have been the main reason for the failure of 
macroeconomic stabilization attempts in 1992-94. 
 
 Inflationary financing under these circumstances was a sort of a “safety valve” – a 
device allowing to finance the reforms (with the inflation tax) without forcing the 
conflicting parties to come to the explicit agreement. It turned out to be a symptom of 
the tensions and contradictions between the interest groups and allowed the 
government to function under the conditions of disagreement between major parties. 
The alternative would have been the open conflict between the confronting sides, 
which could have been associated even with greater costs than the highly inflationary 
environment. In a sense, the rate of inflation was a pretty accurate measure of the 
degree of social consensus on financing the burden of reforms. As the popular sayings 
go, “inflation is better than civil war”, and “nobody yet died from inflation”. 
 
Once there is a need, whether mythical or real, to redistribute income in favor of 
poorest social groups and weakest enterprises, coupled with the inability of the 
governments to raise enough taxes for this redistribution activity and to withstand the 
pressure of interest groups, the story unfolds pretty much in line with Latin American 
type macroeconomic populism (Dornbusch and Edwards, 1989; Sachs, 1989) and 
leaves a strong sense of deja vu.  Constraint by inability to raise tax receipts and by 
the simultaneous need to maintain redistribution in favor of particular interest groups, 
                                                 
10
 Fuel and energy industries were the donors that subsidized agriculture and secondary manufacturing 
not only by being the major source of tax revenues for the government budget, but also by supplying all 
domestic producers with energy at prices below world market level. 
 
20 
 
the governments are left basically with only four options for indirect financing of 
subsidies. 
 
The first one is to maintain control over particular prices. Controls over prices of non-
resource goods do not solve the problem completely, since they require explicit 
subsidies from the budget to cover the losses of companies producing those goods. In 
contrast, price control for fuel, energy and other resource commodities effectively 
takes away rent of resource sector and redistributes it to consumers. This option is 
available to resource rich countries, which may give additional explanation to the 
resource curse story – it may contribute to economic growth of manufacturing 
industries, but only at the expense of losses in energy intensity (Polterovich, Popov, 
Tonis, 2008). 
 
The second alternative way to continue subsidization, when funds are not available, is 
to resort to trivial inflationary financing of the government budget. The government in 
this case compensates for the shortfall of tax revenues by imposing the ruinous for 
growth inflation tax on everyone. 
 
The third way is certainly debt financing – either domestic or external borrowing. 
Debt financing makes sense, when it buys some time for maintaining subsidies while 
conflicting parties are negotiating the way to get rid of them. If it continues for too 
long, however, it only makes things worse, since debt service payments impose an 
additional burden on the government budget. 
 
Finally, the fourth way to continue redistribution with no funds in the budget is to 
maintain the overvalued exchange rate that favors consumers over producers, 
exporters over importers and leads to increase in consumption at the expense of 
savings. Consumption increases in this case due to increase in imports financed 
through external borrowing or foreign exchange reserves, and obviously provides 
only a temporary solution, leading to the balance of payments crisis in the longer 
term. It was shown for developing countries that overvaluation of the exchange rate is 
detrimental for economic growth (Dollar, 1992; Easterly, 1999; Montes, Popov, 1999; 
Polterovich, Popov, 2004). 
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Overvaluation of the exchange rate is usually supported by the governments (that 
collect their taxes in domestic currency, but service the international debt in foreign 
currency) and, of course, by the importers, whose political influence may exceed that 
of exporters. A number of transition economies that maintained the overvalued 
exchange rates in the 1990s, and in 1998-99 experienced the currency crises (Popov, 
2001).  
 
This is another reason why exchange rate based stabilization and currency board 
arrangements are quite risky for transition economies (Montes and Popov, 1999). 
Opening the possibility for the appreciation of real exchange rate (and ensuring 
equilibrium only through balance of payments crisis) these arrangements allow also 
for the continuation of populist policies – redistribution of income from producers to 
consumers. At the end of the day, however, exchange rate management as a weapon 
to fight inflation can play only a limited role because the balance of payments deficit 
cannot continue indefinitely.  
 
Different countries in different periods resorted to one or more of the described above 
mechanisms of implicit redistribution. In Russia, for instance, the government was 
initially (1992-94 relying on controlling resource prices and inflationary financing. 
Since 1995, when exchange rate based stabilization was carried out and the ruble 
reached 70% of its purchasing power parity value (i.e. Russian prices, including re- 
source prices approached 70% of the US prices, which was the apparent overvaluation 
of the ruble), the government relied mostly on debt (domestic and foreign) financing 
and redistribution via overvalued exchange rate. Since 1998 financial crisis, however, 
leading to the collapse of the overvalued rate and to the cessation of international and 
domestic debt financing, the government has to rely largely on price control (via 
export taxes and export restrictions) on major tradable goods (oil, gas metals). 
 
There seems to be two logical ways to deal with the populist redistribution and to 
ensure stable macroeconomic environment. First, to eliminate the need for 
redistribution itself, i.e. to alleviate social and sectoral income inequalities, which is 
of course the task for the long run. Second, to strengthen the government, so that it 
can redistribute income explicitly (direct subsidies) rather than indirectly, or cut the 
magnitude of redistribution altogether. The research on Latin American and other 
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countries has proven that the “transitional democracies” are less efficient than either 
authoritarian regimes or well established democratic regimes in resisting 
macroeconomic populism. It was also shown that countries, where one or two 
multiclass parties have provided the government elites with stable electoral majorities, 
are less prone to demands of populist coalitions (Kaufman and Stallings, 1991). And 
it was shown that illiberal democracies (countries with relatively free elections, but 
poor rule of law) have the worst record in ensuring prudent macroeconomic policy 
(balanced government budget, low government debt, low inflation and non-
overvaluation of the exchange rate) as compared to liberal democracies and liberal 
and illiberal autocracies (Polterovich, Popov, 2007). 
 
Conclusions 
 
Most of the time the budget constraints in the socialist economies were harder than in 
developing countries and no less hard than in developed countries. The soft budget 
constraints (SBC) in socialist economies were not pervasive, as most authors believe, 
but selective, i.e. involved subsidization of some enterprises/industries at the expense 
of the other. This type of selective subsidization is a classic case of industrial policy: 
it may be good or bad, leading to success (China, Vietnam) or failure (USSR, Eastern 
Europe), but cannot be regarded as an intrinsic feature of the socialist centrally 
planned economy and an example of pervasive SBC.  
 
When soft budget constraints exist in the form of subsidization of export oriented 
manufacturing and high tech industries, it may be a necessary component of export 
oriented industrial strategy that was a sine qua non of every single case of economic 
miracle – successful catch up growth of developing countries. 
 
The problem with soft budget constraints in the former USSR and Eastern Europe was 
not the subsidization per se, and even not the subsidization of manufacturing 
industries at the expense of resource industries, trade and financial services, but the 
way this subsidization was carried out – through maintaining higher domestic prices 
for manufactured goods. This was basically an import substitution industrial strategy 
that led to the creation of inefficient industrial dinosaurs and mastodons that proved to 
be uncompetitive once the protection was removed in the 1990s.  
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Pervasive SBC should be associated with permanent government budget deficit, debt 
accumulation, high inflation and other forms of macroeconomic populism. In the 
Soviet Union in the post-war period (after the monetary reform of 1947 and until the 
Gorbachev financial and monetary expansion that started in1987) budget deficit and 
debt were very low, open and hidden inflation was less than several percent a year – a 
better record than in most Western countries.  
 
On the contrary, after the transition to the market in the 1990s the previously hard 
budget constraints weakened dramatically in many EE and FSU countries. This 
resulted in growing budget deficits and high inflation. Most economists agree this 
kind of policy is sub-optimal, but there are political economy factors that make 
populist macroeconomic choices inevitable. The combination of weak state and 
powerful interest groups that cannot agree on how to divide a national pie, forces the 
government to “kick the can down the road” by accumulating deficits and debts, 
printing money (inflationary financing), keeping domestic fuel and energy prices 
below the world level and maintaining an overvalued exchange rate. SBC is just one 
type of this populist macroeconomic policy that was rare in socialist countries, but is 
found in abundance in many developing countries (especially Latin America and Sub-
Sahara Africa) and transition economies (especially FSU states).   
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